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Challenging Abortion Informed Consent
Regulations through the First Amendment: The
Case for Protecting Physicians’ Speech
Maia Dunlap†

INTRODUCTION
A woman finds out she is pregnant. She makes the choice to terminate her pregnancy. Maybe she decides this instantly. Perhaps she
reaches her decision through a series of conversations with her partner,
her family, or her friends. Regardless, there is only one person she will
need to have a conversation with before she can have an abortion: her
physician.
Right? Actually, wrong. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 the Supreme Court allowed states to add themselves to the mix. While affirming a woman’s right to have an abortion,
the Casey Court also acknowledged states’ rights to regulate and express disapproval of the practice. In so doing, the Court opened the door
for states to join the private conversation between a woman and her
physician. In the years since Casey, states have increasingly used this
door to regulate what a physician must do or say to a woman before she
can give her “informed consent” to an abortion.
Because of this, obtaining an abortion can be a dramatically different experience depending on where you live.2 In some states, abortion
is treated like any other medical procedure, can be completed in one
day, and only requires the signing of a standard medical consent form.3
In contrast, many others states require all women seeking abortions to
†
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1
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://ww
w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/
V9ED-QU3M].
3
Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon, What It Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restrictive U.S. State, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/
mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/WRA6-NHJ8].
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first receive an ultrasound,4 a medically unnecessary procedure for
first-trimester abortions (which 89% of abortions are).5 Some states further regulate how physicians must narrate these ultrasounds and how
women must listen.6 Many states require mandatory pre-abortion counseling and a waiting period between receiving counseling and obtaining
the procedure.7 Women may also hear that personhood begins at conception,8 and medically inaccurate claims that medical abortion can be
reversed9 and increases risk of breast cancer,10 suicide,11 and future infertility.12
Claiming to balance the rights of women with those of the state,
the Casey court created a new test, dubbed the undue burden standard.
Under this test, regulations on abortion are permissible provided they
do not impose an undue burden on a woman’s choice to have an abortion
before the fetus reaches viability (i.e. is potentially able to live outside
the woman’s body).13 Most subsequent challenges to state abortion regulations have thus claimed that the regulations at issue impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.14
However, the undue burden standard poses a low bar that most
regulations clear. As an alternative, some challengers have brought
their claims as violations of physicians’ free speech rights under the
First Amendment. Courts review First Amendment challenges under
standards ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, “depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes
underlying it.”15 In the context of informed consent, First Amendment
claims have been subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny that can
invalidate regulations which would otherwise likely survive an undue
burden challenge.
4

Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.o
rg/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/XK9E-6KXS].
5
Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttma
cher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/QHU5-Z8NM].
6
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4.
7
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
8
Id.
9
Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/arizona-doctors-must-saythat-abortions-with-drugs-may-be-reversed.html [https://perma.cc/WAJ3-6HCQ].
10
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (defining viability as “potentially able to live outside
the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”).
14
See Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by
Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (originally published 2004).
15
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
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The challengers in Casey brought precisely such a claim, arguing
that the informed consent provisions at issue infringed physicians’ First
Amendment rights. The Court dismissed this claim in an ambiguous
three-sentence paragraph that left open the question of whether such
challenges can be sustained in the abortion context.16 Whether the undue burden test is the exclusive way through which to assess the constitutionality of informed consent measures remains a live issue. A circuit split has developed, with the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
disallowing separate First Amendment challenges to “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant” informed consent disclosures while the Fourth
Circuit permits them. This leads to a second open question: if Casey
does not foreclose physicians’ First Amendment challenges to informed
consent laws, what standard of review should apply?
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Supreme
Court’s abortion jurisprudence with particular emphasis on Casey. Part
II analyzes the circuit split and the rationales of the Eighth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourth Circuits. Part III looks closely at the language and
reasoning of Casey and argues that it supports the view that First
Amendment challenges to informed consent measures—even those that
are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—can exist independently of
the undue burden standard. Part IV advocates for intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for such challenges.
I.
A.

ABORTION AT THE SUPREME COURT

Pre-Casey

A woman’s right to have an abortion has been constitutionally protected since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade17 in 1973. In Roe,
a pregnant unmarried woman brought suit against Wade, a Texas district attorney, challenging an article of the Texas Penal Code that limited abortions to those done for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.18 Roe raised the question: does the constitutional right to privacy encompass a woman’s decision to have an abortion?19
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and struck down
the Texas statute.20 However, while acknowledging that the right to
personal privacy included a woman’s decision to have an abortion, the
Court did not leave this right unqualified. Instead, it developed a three-

16
17
18
19
20

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 166.
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part framework roughly aligned with the trimesters of pregnancy, allowing for increased state interference and regulation as pregnancy progresses.21 The Court acknowledged states’ “important and legitimate
interest in potential life,”22 but found this interest compelling only at
the point of viability.23 The framework broke down as follows: 1) until
approximately the end of the first trimester, states could not interfere
with a woman’s right to have an abortion; 2) after the first trimester
but before viability, states could regulate abortion only “in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health;”24 3) after viability, states
could freely regulate abortion and even prohibit it, as long as exceptions
existed for the health or life of the woman.25
B.

Casey and the Undue Burden Standard

Roe’s trimester framework governed abortion regulations, albeit
shakily,26 for nearly two decades. In 1992, however, the Court offered a
new approach in Casey. In Casey, Planned Parenthood brought a suit
against Robert Casey, the governor of Pennsylvania, challenging a
Pennsylvania law that restricted abortion access by requiring: 1) written informed consent from a woman seeking an abortion; 2) a twentyfour-hour waiting period between providing a woman with the informed
consent information and performing an abortion; 3) if the woman was a
minor, the informed consent of at least one parent; and 4) if the woman
was married, a statement indicating her husband had been notified of
the pending abortion.27 The informed consent provisions required physicians to inform women of the nature of the procedure, the health risks
of abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the
“unborn child.”28 Women had to be informed of the availability of
printed materials published by the state that described fetal development and provided information about medical assistance for childbirth,

21

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 163.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 164. The Court listed examples of “permissible state regulation in this area,” which
included regulating qualifications of the performing physicians and facilities in which abortions
occur, including licensure. Id. at 163.
25
Id. at 164–65.
26
The Casey court acknowledged the uncertainty that followed Roe in its bold opening:
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages . . . that definition
of liberty is still questioned.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
27
Id. at 844.
28
Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted).
22
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child support, and agencies providing adoption and abortion alternatives.29 If requested, physicians had to provide these materials.30 Under
its new undue burden standard, the Court upheld all of the Pennsylvania provisions except for spousal notification.31 Specifically, the Court
noted that “the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus” did not create an
undue burden.32
While discarding Roe’s trimester framework, the Court claimed to
affirm “Roe’s essential holding”33 through the undue burden standard.
This test has three clearly elucidated parts: first, a woman has the right
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the state;34 second, the state has power to restrict abortions after fetal viability (but must allow exceptions for pregnancies endangering the life of the mother); and third, the state has a
legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health
of women and the life of the fetus.35 This new structure tempered Roe
considerably: states could now regulate the procurement of abortions at
all stages of pregnancy, provided the regulations did not constitute an
undue burden having “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”36 Additionally, in an expression of the extent of its recognition of a
state’s interest in “the life of the unborn,”37 the Casey court allowed for
“state measure[s] designed to persuade [women] to choose childbirth
over abortion,”38 provided the measures “reasonably related to that
goal.”39
While the petitioners in Casey challenged the Pennsylvania statute
primarily as a violation of Roe, they also brought a First Amendment

29

Id.
Id.
31
See id. at 898.
32
Id. at 882.
33
Id. at 846.
34
The Court grounded this right in the Due Process Clause, a departure from Roe’s penumbral
privacy approach. See id. at 846.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 877.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 878.
39
Id. The measures must still conform to the undue burden standard and cannot create “a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Id. at 877.
30
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challenge, claiming the informed consent provisions impermissibly controlled physicians’ speech.40 After assessing the informed consent provisions under the undue burden standard, the Court dismissed this alternative claim in three sentences:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard [citation omitted], but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen
v. Roe [citation omitted]. We see no constitutional infirmity in
the requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.41
Thus, while overall the Court upheld the informed consent requirements under the undue burden standard,42 its treatment of the
First Amendment claim lacks clarity and does not expressly foreclose
independent First Amendment challenges to informed consent provisions.
The undue burden standard remains good law. The Court used it
in Gonzales v. Carhart,43 and more recently in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt.44 While these watershed abortion cases demonstrate the
Court’s continued commitment to the undue burden test, they did not
deal with informed consent provisions or First Amendment claims in
the abortion context. Confusion over Casey’s framing has created a circuit split regarding the permissibility of First Amendment challenges
to abortion informed consent measures, with the Eighth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits on one side, and the Fourth Circuit on the other.
A recent Supreme Court case also deserves mention. In National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (“NIFLA”),45 crisis
pregnancy centers challenged a California statute that (a) required licensed centers to post notices explaining the existence of publicly
funded family-planning services, including abortion, and (b) required
40

See id. at 881.
Id. at 884.
42
“[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue
interference by the State . . . The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that
right.” Id. at 887.
43
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortions under the undue
burden standard).
44
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (striking down a Texas regulation on abortion clinics under the undue
burden standard).
45
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
41
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unlicensed centers to post notices stating that they were not licensed.46
The Court found the fact that the notice requirement for licensed centers was not directly tied to a medical procedure to be dispositive.47 Removed from an informed consent context, the licensed requirements
were viewed as pure content-based regulations of speech.48 Subject to
at least intermediate scrutiny, the Court held the licensed notice requirements unconstitutional.49 The Court also struck down the unlicensed center requirements as “unjustified and unduly burdensome.”50
Relevant here, in its opinion the NIFLA Court characterized the
informed consent provisions in Casey as regulations of professional conduct only incidentally burdening speech, a category subject to a lower
standard of review.51 This indicates a willingness of the current Supreme Court to consider informed consent provisions as regulations of
conduct, not speech, thus weakening the case for robust First Amendment review. Respectfully, I do not believe the NIFLA Court’s framing
conclusively demystifies Casey, as it occurs in dicta52 and does not engage with alternative explanations for Casey’s reasoning. Moreover,
even assuming the NIFLA court correctly characterized Casey, this can
be read as limited to Casey’s facts. At best, read in conjunction with
Casey, NIFLA “create[s] the guiding principle that reasonable regulations that facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure are excepted from heightened scrutiny”53—an uncontroversial proposition.
Notwithstanding NIFLA, the scope of permissible First Amendment
challenges to abortion informed consent measures remains an open
question.

46

Id. at 2368.
Id. at 2373–74.
48
Id. at 2375.
49
Id. The state argued that the requirements should be considered professional speech and
therefore receive a lower standard of review. The Court, although highly skeptical of the professional speech doctrine, determined it did not need to answer the professional speech question “because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
50
Id. at 2378. The State argued that, as commercial speech, the unlicensed requirements
should be subject to the more deferential Zauderer standard. The Court again did not feel the need
to answer whether Zauderer applied because it held that the unlicensed center notice requirements could not meet even its lower standard of review.
51
Id. at 2372–73.
52
The Court’s characterization of Casey provides only an example of a category of speech the
Court notes as warranting lower protection. The Court supports this category with citations to
many other cases as well. Id. at 2373. Defining Casey is therefore “not necessary” nor a “necessary
antecedent” to the Court’s holding. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
53
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 449 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting).
47
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: SINGULARITY OF THE UNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD?
A.

Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits Dismiss First Amendment Challenges to Informed Consent Laws

The Eighth Circuit has twice upheld the supremacy of the undue
burden test when considering First Amendment challenges to informed
consent requirements. In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I),54 the Eighth Circuit, sitting
en banc, rejected a compelled-speech challenge to a South Dakota law
requiring doctors to provide several statements to women seeking abortions as part of obtaining informed consent. These included statements
that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being,” which “the pregnant woman has an existing [constitutionally protected] relationship with,” and “[t]hat by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights
with regards to that relationship will be terminated.”55
Overruling the district court, the Eighth Circuit found the mandated statements well within the state’s regulatory power. The court
concluded:
Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information
might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.56
Therefore, in order to succeed on its compelled speech claim,
Planned Parenthood had to show that the mandated disclosures were
untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.57 The statute at issue defined “human being,” for the purposes of the informed consent provision, as “including the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal
ages from fertilization to full gestation,”58 and the court held the statutory definition controlling.59 Given this, the court found the challenged
54

530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 726.
56
Id. at 734–35.
57
See id. at 735.
58
Id. at 727.
59
“South Dakota recognizes the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]here [a
term] is defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.’” Id. at 735 (citing Bruggeman
v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)).
55

443]

CASE FOR PROTECTING PHYSICIANS’ SPEECH

451

disclosures truthful and relevant.60 In sum, the Eighth Circuit held Casey and Gonzales precluded First Amendment claims to informed consent laws when the speech at issue is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit, again sitting en banc and
again reversing the district court, reaffirmed its reading of Casey and
upheld another part of the South Dakota statute in Rounds II.61 As part
of obtaining informed consent, the statute required physicians to provide a written “description of . . . statistically significant risk factors to
which the pregnant woman would be subjected, including . . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”62 The Eighth
Circuit held that this statement did not imply a causal link between
abortion and suicide but rather indicated relative risk, which it found
sufficiently supported by the scientific record and therefore truthful.63
The court further held that despite medical and scientific uncertainty,
the record did not conclusively rule out abortion as “a causal factor in
the observed correlation between abortion and suicide,”64 and therefore
the required disclosure was not misleading or irrelevant.65
The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey.66 In Lakey, physicians and abortion
providers brought a section 1983 action against the state of Texas, challenging a recently enacted bill that significantly amended Texas’ informed consent laws.67 The challenged amendments required physicians performing abortions to “perform and display a sonogram of the
fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus . . . [and] explain . . . the results of each procedure.”68 A woman had to certify her
physician’s compliance with these measures and wait 24 hours before
receiving an abortion.69 The statute permitted a woman to decline to
view the images or hear the heartbeat, but she could only decline to

60

Id. at 735. The court did not explicitly discuss why this statement is not misleading, but did
note that it would be “incumbent upon one preparing the disclosure form required by [the statute],
and upon a physician answering a patient’s questions about it, to account for any applicable statutory definitions.” Id.
61
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
62
Id. at 894.
63
“[T]he studies submitted by the State are sufficiently reliable to support the truth of the
proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher for women who abort
their pregnancies compared to women who give birth or have not become pregnant.” Id. at 898–
99.
64
Id. at 904.
65
Id. at 905.
66
667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
67
Id. at 572.
68
Id. at 573.
69
Id.
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receive an explanation of the sonogram images under three conditions:
1) if her pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 2) if she was a minor,
or 3) if the fetus had a documented irreversible medical condition or
abnormality.70 The district court granted a preliminary injunction
against the disclosure provisions as impermissible compelled speech.71
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Casey precluded the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. The Lakey court focused on Casey’s
brief discussion of the First Amendment claim, finding its absence of
inquiry into compelling interests or narrow tailoring to be the “antithesis of strict scrutiny.”72 The Fifth Circuit then turned to Gonzales, noting its reaffirmance of Casey in upholding states’ “significant role . . . in
regulating the medical profession” and the government’s ability to “use
its voice and regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the
life within the woman.”73 The court found that these two cases clearly
established that “informed consent laws that do not impose an undue
burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they
require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures,” and “are
part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not
fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First
Amendment strict scrutiny.”74 The court supported this interpretation
of the case law by citing the Eighth Circuit in Rounds I.75
The Fifth Circuit then noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Casey and
Rounds, the plaintiff-appellees in the case at hand had brought solely a
First Amendment claim.76 The court found this impermissible:
If the disclosures are truthful and non-misleading, and if they
would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then Appellees would, by means of their First
Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck
between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey,
however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed consent context.77

70

Id. at 578 n.6.
Id. at 573. The provisions were also challenged as void for vagueness, outside of the scope
of this Comment.
72
Id. at 575.
73
Id. at 575–76 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)) (internal quotations
omitted).
74
Id. at 576.
75
“Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey and Gonzales
in the same way.” Id. at 576–77 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735
(8th Cir. 2008)).
76
Id. at 577.
77
Id.
71
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The Fifth Circuit finally denied the contention raised by plaintiffappellees that the disclosure requirements at issue differed qualitatively from those in Casey.78 The appellees’ argument here focused on
two distinctions. First, because the disclosures of the sonogram and fetal heartbeat were “medically unnecessary,” they went “beyond the
standard practice of medicine within the state’s regulatory powers.”79
Second, requiring the physician to explain the results of the sonogram
and fetal heart auscultation verbally “makes the physician the ‘mouthpiece’ of the state.”80 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the first point under
Casey and Gonzales.81 As to the second point, the court held that this
“mode of delivery does not make a constitutionally significant difference
from the ‘availability’ provision in Casey . . . [t]he mode of compelled
expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant, although the context is.”82 For all these reasons, the court found that the provisions did
not violate the First Amendment because they were “sustainable under
Casey . . . [and] within the State’s power to regulate the practice of medicine.”83 The Fifth Circuit denied petitioners appeal for en banc review.84
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the issue and aligned in decision with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits. In EMW Women’s Surgical
Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar,85 the court overruled the district court and upheld the constitutionality of a Kentucky informed consent statute
(H.B.2) against a First Amendment challenge.86 Echoing the Texas law
at issue in Lakey, H.B.2 required that before giving an abortion a physician perform an ultrasound, display and explain the images, and auscultate the fetal heartbeat.87 Although any patient could request that

78

Id. at 578.
Id.
80
Id. at 579.
81
“Appellees’ argument ignores that Casey and Gonzales . . . emphasize that the gravity of the
decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical detail, that the condition
of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures.” Id.
82
Id. at 579–80.
83
Id. at 580.
84
Press Release, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies
Request to Rehear Texas Ultrasound Case (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.reproductiverights.org/pres
s-room/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-denies-request-to-rehear-texas-ultrasound-case [https://perm
a.cc/2X5L-7W5Y].
85
920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
86
Id. at 446.
87
Id. at 424.
79
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the physician turn down the volume of the auscultation, the law provided no exemptions from these disclosures except in the case of a medical emergency or a medically necessary abortion.88
Relying heavily on its reading of Casey and NIFLA, the Beshar
court determined that “First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not
apply to incidental regulation of professional speech89 that is part of the
practice of medicine and . . . such incidental regulation includes mandated informed-consent requirements, provided that the disclosures are
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.”90 Characterizing the sonogram
provisions as “‘materially identical’”91 to Casey’s requirements and
highly relevant,92 the court found no constitutional infirmity in H.B.2.
The court discussed Lakey and Rounds I at length, noting their “support
[for] our holding today.”93
B.

Fourth Circuit Upholds First Amendment Challenge to Informed
Consent Law

Two years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey, but before the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Beshar, the Fourth Circuit addressed a compelled speech challenge to a strikingly similar statute. In Stuart v. Camnitz,94 physicians and abortion providers challenged the Display of
Real-Time View Requirement of the North Carolina Woman’s Right to
Know Act (“WRKA”).95 The requirement mandated ultrasounds for all
women seeking abortions and required physicians to display the sonogram and “describe the fetus in detail, ‘includ[ing] the presence, location, and dimensions of the unborn child within the uterus and the number of unborn children depicted,’ . . . as well as ‘the presence of external
members and internal organs, if present and viewable.’”96 It also required physicians to provide women the option of hearing the fetal heart
auscultation.97 The WRKA allowed exceptions to these measures only
in the case of medical emergency; however, a woman could always
“‘avert[ ] her eyes from the displayed images’ and ‘refus[e] to hear the
88

Id. at 424–25.
The Beshar court made NIFLA’s characterization of Casey central to its analysis and dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart (see part B) because it pre-dated NIFLA and therefore gave “insufficient regard” to NIFLA’s characterization of Casey. Id. at 435.
90
Id. at 429.
91
Id. at 431 (internal citations omitted).
92
Id. (“one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram images for twenty-first-century informed consent.”).
93
Id. at 434.
94
774 F. 3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
95
Id. at 242–43.
96
Id. at 243.
97
Id.
89
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simultaneous explanation and medical description’ by presumably covering her eyes and ears.”98 The district court, applying heightened, intermediate scrutiny, held that these requirements violated the physicians’ First Amendment rights to free speech and entered a permanent
injunction.99
Unlike in Lakey or Rounds, here a unanimous Fourth Circuit affirmed.100 Analyzing the regulations first through a compelled speech
lens, the Fourth Circuit held “[t]he Requirement [the regulations described above] is quintessential compelled speech. It forces physicians
to say things they otherwise would not say. . .[T]he statement compelled here is ideological; it conveys a particular opinion.”101 Referencing Lakey, the court acknowledged that the mandated disclosures at issue were factual but did not find this fact dispositive:
[While] it is true that the words the state puts into the doctor’s
mouth are factual, that does not divorce the speech from its
moral or ideological implications. “[C]ontext matters.” . . . [The
regulations] explicitly promote[] a pro-life message by demanding the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion
debate—and does so shortly before the time of decision when the
intended recipient is most vulnerable.102
The Fourth Circuit then assessed the requirements as standard
medical regulation, acknowledging that states retain rights to regulate
professional speech and mandate informed consent to medical procedures.103 Despite this, the court held “individuals [do not] simply abandon their First Amendment rights when they commence practicing a
profession,”104 and that “[w]ith all forms of compelled speech, [the court]
must look to the context of the regulation to determine when the state’s
regulatory authority has extended too far.”105 In the context of the
WRKA, the court held that “the confluence of these factors points toward borrowing a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard used in
certain commercial speech cases.”106
98
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Id. at 244.
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Id. at 256.
101
Id. at 246. Note that the state freely admitted “the purpose and anticipated effect of the
Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their
minds or reassess their decisions.” Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 247.
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The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated its reasons for diverging from
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits:
With respect, our sister circuits read too much into Casey and
Gonzales. The single paragraph in Casey does not assert that
physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding abortions, nor does it announce the proper
level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel
speech to the extraordinary extent present here . . . the plurality
simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated
by the State here.’ That particularized finding hardly announces
a guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion.107
The court also held Gonzales, an undue burden case raising no First
Amendment claim, inapplicable to the issue at hand. The court noted
that Gonzales “says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should
apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in
the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech
rights.”108 The Fourth Circuit thus found its First Amendment analysis
consistent with Casey and Gonzales. The State appealed to the Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari.109
III. CASEY DOES NOT FORECLOSE PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO INFORMED CONSENT LAWS
A.

Casey Does Not Displace First Amendment Protection for Physicians

The Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have curtailed First Amendment protection for physicians in the context of abortion informed consent measures. Each circuit held that when mandated informed consent
disclosures are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to
have an abortion, they are permissible under Casey as long as they do
not constitute an undue burden. Essentially, these circuits have disallowed independent First Amendment analysis of physicians’ compelled
speech claims by collapsing free speech analysis into the undue burden
test. This reasoning misinterprets Casey. As Nadia Sawicki writes, “it
is essential to recognize that the ‘truthful, not misleading, and relevant’
requirement is a condition on the constitutionality of disclosure laws
107
108
109

Id. at 249.
Id.
Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘undue burden’ standard, rather
than a condition of the First Amendment.”110 As recently articulated by
Judge Donald in her powerful dissenting opinion in Beshar:
The majority relies on undue burden jurisprudence to fashion a
test that they believe comprehensively captures informed consent. The result is erroneous . . . The three elements the majority identifies—truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—were
drawn from Casey, a controlling case that considered both an undue burden and a First Amendment challenge. These three elements, however, were central only to Casey’s undue burden analysis . . . Nowhere are these elements even mentioned in Casey’s
discussion of the First Amendment. It is a mistake to transpose
Casey’s holding on undue burden to the First Amendment challenge here.111
In other words, Casey holds that truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant informed consent disclosures do not per se violate a woman’s constitutional right to choose. Casey does not, however, indicate that such
disclosures can never be subject to First Amendment review.
Common sense indicates that this must be the case. Imagine South
Dakota revises its disclosure requirement with the only change being
physicians are now required to stand up on a chair and yell at a woman
that her abortion will end the life of a unique living human being. While
this hypothetical obviously steps outside of the bounds of the regulations considered in Casey, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a framework
through which to challenge it. The disclosure has already been held
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant, ending the First Amendment inquiry. While the yelling could be challenged as creating an undue burden, the Eighth Circuit would struggle to qualitatively differentiate it
from the written statement, especially given the permissibility of regulations designed to dissuade women from choosing abortion.112 Even if
the Eighth Circuit invalidated this law under the undue burden standard, the fact remains that it would be impossible, under Eighth Circuit
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Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and
Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 24–25 (2016).
111
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald,
J., dissenting).
112
“Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion,
even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added).
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precedent, for a physician to challenge this law under the First Amendment. This significantly reduces protection of physicians’ speech.
It does not seem plausible that the Court would create this large
exemption from First Amendment protection in such an ambiguous
way. Justice Scalia famously wrote that “Congress . . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”113 The same reasoning should apply to Supreme Court holdings,
particularly in the context of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has historically been hesitant to create exceptions to free speech protection. As the Court recently stated in NIFLA, “[t]his Court has ‘been reluctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished constitutional protection,’”114 and “[we have] been especially reluctant to
‘exemp[t] a category of speech from the normal prohibition on contentbased restrictions.’”115 In this context, reading the three sentences in
Casey as creating a new category of lessened speech protection—for
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant informed consent disclosures—
seems all the more implausible.116 A simpler, more reasonable reading
of Casey is that the Court, having already held the informed consent
provisions permissible under the undue burden standard, and finding
the regulations at issue within the usual confines of a state’s regulatory
power, did not feel the need to explore the First Amendment issue further.117
B.

Whalen Does Not Trump Wooley

In its discussion of the First Amendment issues in Casey, the Court
cited to Wooley v. Maynard118 and Whalen v. Roe,119 two seemingly conflicting cases. In Wooley, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a
New Hampshire statute that required residents to display “Live Free

113

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing Denver
Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996)).
115
Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012)).
116
I recognize the irony of using NIFLA to support this claim, given its characterization of
Casey—but disputing that characterization does not rob other portions of the opinion of their persuasiveness.
117
The courts that have found otherwise have arguably fallen prey to a phenomenon recently
articulated in a different context by Justice Gorsuch: “treating judicial opinions as if they were
statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after,
and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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or Die” on their license plates.120 In Whalen, the Court upheld, as an
appropriate use of state police power, a New York statute requiring physicians to disclose to the government prescription records of certain
drugs.121 As Robert Post writes, “[e]xactly how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are meant to qualify the broad police power
discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”122 However, a close look at
each case shows that Whalen should not qualify Wooley to the extent of
foreclosing a physician’s ability to bring First Amendment challenges
to informed consent laws.
The Supreme Court struck down the license plate statute in
Wooley, recognizing that “the right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”123 In Lakey,
the Fifth Circuit took up Wooley as a defense against the plaintiffs’ contention that requiring physicians to voice the mandated information
was constitutionally significant. The Lakey court cited Wooley as support for the statement that “[t]he mode of compelled expression is not
by itself constitutionally relevant, although the context is.”124 However,
Wooley suggests more than that. Comparing the case to West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,125 the seminal case in which the
Supreme Court acknowledged a First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech in the context of the school flag salute, the Wooley
Court stated that “[c]ompelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree.”126 This statement supports two suppositions: first, compelled speech is an infringement, and second, the extent to which it is compelled can affect the analysis. Therefore, the
Lakey court’s exclusive focus on context is incomplete. Wooley indicates
that the mode of compelled expression is also relevant insofar as it can
heighten the severity of the infringement. A provision demanding that
doctors voice the state’s information in their own words requires significantly more affirmative action than merely providing pamphlets. Thus,
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Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (“We must also determine whether the State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates.”).
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Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
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Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946 (2007).
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Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
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Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir.
2012).
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319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
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the provisions at issue in Lakey analogize more closely to Barnette than
to Wooley, and Wooley suggests that this increases the gravity of the
infringement.
Immediately following its reference to Wooley, the Casey court
acknowledges that the medical context tempers its First Amendment
analysis, citing to Whalen. In Whalen, the Court upheld, against a privacy challenge, a New York statute requiring that the state receive a
copy of every prescription for a certain class of drugs categorized as
highly dangerous.127 In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit described Whalen in one
sentence as a case “in which the Court had upheld a regulation of medical practice against a right to privacy challenge.”128 Again, their synopsis is imprecise. In analyzing the constitutional validity of the provision,
the Whalen court considered its effect on the independence of physicians
and patients:
Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the
right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician,
to acquire and to use needed medication . . . the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.
We hold that . . . [the] impact of the patient-identification requirements in the [statute] on either the reputation or the independence of the patients is [not] sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment (emphasis added).129
While the Court did uphold the medical regulation, it clearly
weighed, as highly significant, the regulation’s effect on the independence of patients’ and physicians’ decision making. With regards to the
independence of patients, Casey and Gonzales admittedly allow for
states to voice their disapproval of abortion even if it results in altering
a woman’s choice to have one. Application of the undue burden standard
thus encompasses any infringement on patients’ decision making in its
calculation. However, while the undue burden standard speaks to the
relevance of women’s independence in receiving abortions, it does not
speak to that of the physicians offering them.
The Casey Court’s citation to Whalen indicates that infringements
on the independence of doctors should be factored into the permissibility of medical regulations. Excluding First Amendment challenges to
informed consent measures, however, removes the only avenue through
which such infringements can be considered. Although in Casey, like in
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Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
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Whalen, the extent of infringement on the independence of the physician-patient relationship fell within permissible grounds, that determination was limited to the facts of Casey.130 The provisions in Rounds,
Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, which prescribed descriptive and invasive
procedures doctors must follow, intrude on the physician-patient relationship significantly more.
In sum, allowing physicians to bring First Amendment challenges
to informed consent provisions does not “trump the balance Casey
struck between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives.”131 Casey
weighed women’s rights and states’ rights in crafting the undue burden
standard, but it did no such careful weighing in regard to physicians’
First Amendment rights. Thus, when the burden on physicians’ speech
goes significantly beyond the regulations upheld in Casey, Casey no
longer applies.
IV. ADOPTING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Competing Interests Clash in the Context of Informed Consent
Laws

Assuming that Casey does not foreclose physicians from bringing
First Amendment challenges to informed consent laws, there remains
an open question: what standard should courts use to review these challenges? With First Amendment claims, context drives this inquiry.132
As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Stuart, informed consent laws lie at
a unique intersection between impermissible content-based compelled
speech and permissible state regulations of mandated informed consent
to a medical procedure.133 The Supreme Court has not conclusively
weighed in on this muddled area of First Amendment law; consequently, Casey, with all its resulting confusion, offers the Court’s clearest declaration on the issue.
Content-based restrictions on speech are generally assessed under
strict scrutiny.134 For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must further a
compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to effectuate
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“We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992) (emphasis added).
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Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
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“Laws that impinge upon speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on
the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774
F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
133
Id.
134
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
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that interest.135 Many commenters consider this rigorous standard essentially fatal, as the Supreme Court has upheld only two speech restriction laws under it.136 Freedom from compelled speech, or the right
not to speak, has long been recognized as protected under the First
Amendment. Compelled speech is necessarily content-based and thus
also assessed under strict scrutiny.137 Viewed purely through this lens,
informed consent laws that compel physician speech, like those in
Rounds, Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, would be reviewed under strict
scrutiny and would almost certainly be stricken down.
However, compelled speech of medical professionals runs up
against another line of precedent. States have police powers through
which they can regulate medicine and other professions.138 Courts generally review regulations of this sort under rational basis review, which
merely requires a statute be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.139 While not quite a rubber stamp, most laws pass this
deferential standard. Additionally, the necessity of informed consent to
medical procedures is well established under tort law.140 Similarly, physicians are routinely held liable for malpractice, even when the harm
results from a physician’s speech or lack thereof (e.g. failure to inform
a patient of a procedure’s risks or giving incorrect medical advice).141
In Casey, the Court acknowledged both these lines of precedent:
“the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”142 Beyond this statement and the citations to Wooley and Maynard discussed in Part III, the Casey Court
did not offer a precise standard through which to assess infringements
on physicians’ First Amendment rights.
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Eliminating the Extremes (Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Review)

While the appropriate standard could thus fall anywhere from
strict scrutiny to rational basis review, the endpoints of the range can
be eliminated from consideration. A standard of strict scrutiny seems
hard to reconcile with Casey.143 As the Lakey court rightfully notes, the
Casey Court’s three-sentence First Amendment discussion “is clearly
not a strict scrutiny analysis . . . [because] [i]t inquires into neither
compelling interests nor narrow tailoring.”144 Moreover, applying strict
scrutiny to abortion informed consent laws would run afoul of the
Court’s historic recognition of state laws regulating the medical profession, a point noted by the Casey court itself.145 Sound policy reasons
buoy this recognition. Patients depend on physicians to inform them of
their treatment options, but they usually lack the necessary medical
background or understanding to validate the information independently. Thus, by necessity, patients place blind trust in the advice
they receive from their doctors. This trust is made less blind, however,
by two systems working in tandem: indirect regulation through medical
malpractice liability, and direct regulation by the state. Reviewing
these regulations under strict scrutiny would inappropriately encumber
this system, even in the limited context of abortion informed consent
measures.
Rational basis review, at first blush, appears better supported by
the language used by the Casey court in its discussion of the First
Amendment claim. The Court’s use of the word “reasonable” can be read
as synonymous with rational,146 and its cursory First Amendment analysis could indicate deference to the state’s regulatory power. However,
as Carl Coleman explains, “the plurality made this statement only after
having already determined (in the context of its due process analysis)
that the state had a ‘substantial’ interest in requiring the disclosures
and noting ‘the ways in which the speech requirement was narrowly
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This statement should not be taken as an endorsement of Casey’s holding. However, this
Comment seeks to offer a standard that coheres with precedent and could be used with the current
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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“On the one hand, [the Casey plurality’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such
laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often
used as a synonym for ‘rational.’” Coleman, supra note 144, at 9.
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drawn.’”147 Given this context, the word “reasonable” alone should not
determine the standard of review. Moreover, application of rational basis review would render the discussion in Part III largely academic, because all of the informed consent measures mentioned so far would
likely survive. This would essentially allow the carve-out of First
Amendment protection for informed consent measures functionally
claimed by the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Thus, for the reasons
discussed in Part III, rational basis review cannot be the appropriate
standard.
In sum, both extremes—strict scrutiny and rational basis review—
fail as potential standards of review. Strict scrutiny is incompatible
with the language in Casey and fails to acknowledge the state’s legitimate regulatory role in the realm of medical disclosures. Rational basis
review ignores the context of Casey and would, in effect, impermissibly
excuse abortion informed consent measures from meaningful review.
C.

Searching the Middle for a Standard

Rejecting both strict scrutiny and rational basis review eliminates
the clearest available standards, forcing an examination of the mushy
middle ground of First Amendment protection. As will be discussed in
sub-section D, intermediate scrutiny emerges from this search as the
best standard. Reaching that conclusion requires analysis of why other
possible intermediate standards fail in the context of informed consent
to abortion.148 In this section, two other potential standards that have
been offered as options will be examined: “truthful, nonmisleading, and
relevant” (hereinafter “TNR”), and “factual and noncontroversial” (the
Zauderer standard). Both fail to strike the right balance of protection.
As discussed in section II(a), the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits
used a “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant” standard to assess the
challenged informed consent measures. In so doing, these circuits inappropriately folded First Amendment analysis into the undue burden
test (see section III). This does not, however, mean that a TNR standard
should be disregarded per se. While the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits
147

Id.
For the purposes of this Comment I have set aside the concept of professional speech as a
framework through which to consider abortion informed consent requirements. Professional
speech has received varied and inconsistent treatment in the circuit courts. See Erika Schutzman,
We Need Professional Help: Advocating For a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of
Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 2019, 2023 (“Courts have provided little clarity as to the extent to which the First Amendment rights of professionals should be
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of professional speech, with varying results.”). Moreover, the Court’s opinion in NIFLA casts doubt
on the validity of the professional speech doctrine. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v.
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separate category of speech.”).
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erred in failing to acknowledge the necessity of an independent First
Amendment analysis, had they done so, TNR could have been an appropriate standard. Such an approach would uphold informed consent
measures that mandate truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures.
A TNR test has the benefit of seemingly easy compatibility with
Casey. The Casey court held the truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant
disclosures at issue in the Pennsylvania law admissible under the undue burden test. It then went on to find no First Amendment issue with
the mandated disclosures. It follows that, at a minimum, truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures similar in kind to those seen in
Casey pass First Amendment scrutiny.149
Applied beyond Casey, however, TNR offers a slippery standard.
The circuit split discussed in Part II illustrates this: in some jurisdictions, information relevant to having an abortion includes an often unnecessary and costly medical procedure, while in others it does not. Laboratories of democracy notwithstanding, a standard does not offer good
guidance if speech relating to a medical procedure can be so differently
conscripted depending on the state in which it occurs. Pulling a unique
First Amendment standard from Casey stretches the Court’s acknowledgment of abortion exceptionalism beyond recognition.150
Another midway standard comes from the context of commercial
speech. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
of Ohio,151 the Court upheld an Ohio Disciplinary Rule that required
attorneys advertising contingent-fee based representation to disclose
that clients may have to pay certain costs if they lose.152 The Court in
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However, a reasonableness assessment also seems baked into the Casey Court’s discussion
of the informed consent measures. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“In short, requiring that the woman
be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance
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Zauderer indicated that disclosure requirements mandating only
“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under
which . . . services will be available”153 would be upheld if they “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers,”154 and were not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”155 From this
language the Zauderer standard emerged, namely “more deferential review to some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech.’”156 Elements of the
reach and scope of Zauderer remain unclear.157
Some commentators have suggested that courts could use the Zauderer standard to assess regulations relating to abortion, including informed consent measures.158 Such an approach would uphold the constitutionality of factual and uncontroversial informed consent
disclosures. Prior to NIFLA, this approach arguably had legs. In the
wake of NIFLA, however, the use of Zauderer in the abortion context
cannot stand. In considering the appropriate standard of review for the
California notice requirement for licensed clinics, the Court stated: “The
Zauderer standard does not apply here . . . The notice in no way relates
to the services that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these
clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.”159 Arguably, informed consent measures
differ qualitatively from the notice provisions in NIFLA because they
relate more directly to the service being offered (abortion). However,
NIFLA clearly colors abortion as a controversial topic, sharply circumscribing Zauderer’s application. Moreover, even without considering
NIFLA, Zauderer review would likely strike down many of the informed
consent measures upheld in Casey (while describing the nature of the
procedure and associated health risks might pass, requiring notice of
153
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the probable gestational age of the child as well as state-sponsored materials regarding alternatives seems controversial). Given both this and
the framing of abortion in NIFLA, it follows that abortion informed consent disclosures do not qualify for Zauderer review.
D. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard
Intermediate scrutiny (sometimes also referred to as heightened
scrutiny) straddles the line between rational basis review and strict
scrutiny. It developed as a response to gender discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment160 and more recently has emerged as
the standard for assessing regulations of some commercial speech.161
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate “at least that
the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and
that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest,”162 with a “fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends.”163 Courts sometimes define the appropriate fit as one that is not
“more extensive than necessary.”164 Under intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he
court can and should take into account the effect of the regulation on
the intended recipient of the compelled speech, especially where she is
a captive listener.”165
Intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances the tensions created
by informed consent measures. On the one hand, the regulation of private medical decisions falls within the ambit of the state. On the other
hand, abortion is a matter of public concern, and many informed consent measures are designed precisely to express the state’s disapproval
of the practice in general. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that
“[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection’. . . In contrast, speech on matters of
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”166 Governmental regulations of speech on matters of public concern traditionally
trigger a higher level of scrutiny.167 Abortion qualifies as an issue in
both realms: private as applied to a woman’s particular circumstances,
160
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which are wholly her own, yet a controversial part of the public forum.
In choosing the dialogue between a woman and her physician as a time
during which to express disapproval of abortion, states have introduced
the public forum into a “deeply personal decision[].”168
This raises concerns of government overreach, flagged by Justice
Thomas in NIFLA. Justice Thomas observed that the Supreme Court
“has stressed the danger of content-based regulations ‘in the fields of
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.’”169 Noting that “‘[d]octors help patients make deeply personal decisions, and
their candor is crucial,’”170 Justice Thomas warned that “[t]hroughout
history, governments have ‘manipulat[ed] the content of doctor-patient
discourse to increase state power and suppress minorities.”171 Context
can either increase or mitigate this concern. State regulations designed
to empower personal and private decisions by requiring physicians to
provide largely uncontroversial information lessen this concern. For example, a law requiring disclosure of specific risks about electroconvulsive treatment mostly affects a private treatment decision and does not
implicate a greater public issue. Content-based regulations that touch
on issues of public concern, however, increase the fear of government
manipulation, and therefore require more protection under the First
Amendment. Using intermediate scrutiny for abortion informed consent measures recognizes the state’s regulatory power while ensuring
that regulations impacting speech on an issue of public concern receive
adequate First Amendment protection.172
Moreover, informed consent measures implicate two constitutional
guarantees: a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and her physician’s right to be free from compelled speech. As noted, the law handles each separately, under the undue burden test and the First Amendment, respectively. However, a better approach would recognize that
each infringement does not occur in a vacuum. In compelling physicians’ speech and conduct, informed consent measures necessarily
touch on a woman’s right to an abortion as well. The law should recognize this dual infringement by adopting a higher standard of review in
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assessing the relevant free speech claim—namely, intermediate scrutiny.173 Notably, the Supreme Court has adopted such a hybrid rights
approach in regard to one category of free speech claims.174
Analogous reasoning should apply in the case of abortion informed
consent measures. This is not to advocate for a generally more liberal
adoption of the hybrid rights approach. However, such an approach
would be particularly appropriate in the limited context of abortion informed consent measures, where the relevant harm to women is deemphasized when informed consent measures are challenged under the
First Amendment (see part E). A hybrid rights approach would also
help insulate informed consent measures from being challenged as regulations of conduct that only incidentally burden speech, thereby ensuring a higher standard of review.
Advocating for intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard for
assessing abortion informed consent requirements necessitates addressing its consistency with Casey. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart offered intermediate scrutiny as consistent with Supreme Court precedent but did not explain its rationale.175 Examined closely, consistency
with Casey is the main weakness of intermediate scrutiny. The problem
does not stem from the text;176 rather, one can legitimately argue that
the informed consent provisions upheld in Casey would flunk intermediate scrutiny. A state’s substantial interest in the potentiality of life is
clearly supported by Casey and Gonzales. This leaves only an inquiry
into the fit between this end and the means used in Casey. It is not clear
that requiring physicians to tell a woman the probable gestational age
of the fetus, and give her information regarding abortion alternatives,
are measures reasonably drawn to achieve that interest. Perhaps an
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appropriate fit would only require that physicians offer to tell the gestational age, and that the state raise awareness about abortion alternatives through a general advertising campaign rather than through doctors. One can thus argue that the Casey provisions overstep a state’s
interest and therefore would fail intermediate scrutiny review.
However, one can also plausibly argue that the Casey requirements
would withstand intermediate scrutiny review. In light of the weight
the Supreme Court has given to this particular state interest, the disclosure requirements in Casey seem minimally invasive and appropriately tailored. To put it simply, this is a close call. However, given the
other reasons weighing in favor of intermediate scrutiny, a slightly precarious relationship with Casey should not ultimately be disqualifying.
Rather, courts should use Casey as a helpful guide for framing their fit
inquiry. Regulations similar in kind to those in Casey, such as giving
the age of the fetus or offering printed materials describing alternative
options and support, can be seen as representative of the appropriate
balance between a state’s interest in potential life and the means it can
use to further it.
E.

#MeToo Movement Supports Use of Intermediate Scrutiny

The context of #MeToo also supports the use of intermediate scrutiny for assessing informed consent regulations. When Casey replaced
Roe’s trimester system, it fundamentally altered the reproductive
rights of women. Casey’s undue burden standard has allowed states to
encumber pre-viability abortions through a wide range of regulations.
The laxity of the undue burden standard as a tool through which to attack these increasingly severe state regulations has created a special
need for First Amendment claims in this context.
First Amendment claims to informed consent measures, however,
necessarily shift the focus from women to their doctors. The relevant
constitutional harm is no longer the burden on the woman, but rather
the infringement on her doctor. Particularly in the context of #MeToo,
this should give us pause. The #MeToo movement has shone a bright
and harsh light on the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment
against women. While sexual harassment is a critical issue, #MeToo
also goes beyond this. At its core, it speaks to our culture’s historic and
deeply-rooted disregard of women’s agency in all aspects of life, from
the bedroom, to the boardroom, to the street. The Court in Casey
acknowledged that the right to an abortion is justified in part by “the
right to physical autonomy.”177 We should consider the laws discussed
earlier in this light. Giving a woman false information that abortion
177
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increases her suicide risk tells her that the state knows her better than
she knows herself. Forcing her to endure an invasive medical procedure
solely to show her images of the pregnancy she came to the doctor to
terminate implies that she does not fully know what she is doing.
This harm is lost, though, when framing the legal issue under the
First Amendment. This is not to question the exigency of free speech
concerns. However, the informed consent laws considered in this Comment were designed, above all, to impact women seeking abortions, not
their doctors. By focusing on physicians, we surrender the interests of
women to those of others.178 This denies women agency in yet another
arena where it has been historically neglected: the courtroom. Particularly in the era of #MeToo, we shouldn’t lose sight of this quiet injustice.
The undue burden test does not adequately protect women’s agency
and autonomy when seeking an abortion. Free speech challenges to
abortion informed consent measures offer a second-best tool with which
to attack invasive regulations. Assessing these regulations through intermediate scrutiny allows courts to consider how a state has tailored a
regulation and its effect on the listener. In this inquiry, there is room to
consider a regulation’s impact on women. Therefore, adopting intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for informed consent measures
does some work toward remedying the harm done by the First Amendment framing of this issue.
CONCLUSION
In crafting the undue burden standard in Casey, the Supreme
Court carefully weighed the rights of women and the rights of the state.
The rights of physicians, however, received no such measured consideration. Reading Casey as exempting abortion informed consent provisions from First Amendment challenge bends reason to the breaking
point. Casey does not foreclose these challenges, nor does it offer a precise standard with which to review them. Intermediate scrutiny is the
only standard that appropriately handles the conflicting interests at the
heart of abortion informed consent regulations, particularly in the era
of #MeToo.
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Admittedly, many physicians are female. However, this does not negate the harm in a shift
from an entirely female category—women seeking abortions—to a category that, while inclusive
of women, also includes men. Moreover, the necessity of obtaining an abortion for the women seeking them makes them a particularly vulnerable group of women, a fact that does not extend to
female physicians.

